We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held liable for damages) and normatives incentives (the fear of social disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. There may be multiple equilibria within a given legal regime, as well as multiple socio-legal equilibria. In particular, there are high stigma-high evidentiary standard regimes versus low stigma-low standard ones. We argue that this may explain some of the differences between common law and civil law regarding the notions of fault or negligence. Our analysis also provides an explanation for trends currently observed in civil-law systems, in particular the weakening of evidentiary requirements in tort cases.
Introduction
Social norms as guide to behavior may both be substitutes and complements for law. Kaplow and Shavell (2002) observe that there is a strong norm to avoid injuring others and to compensate them for injuries one does cause.
A similar observation was made by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral
Sentiments. An individual found to have caused harm due to his carelessness faces not only a legal sanction-the damages he must pay the victim-but also social disapproval or stigma, which presumably is by itself a source of disutility. In preventing accidental harm, social behavioral norms and the fear of disapproval if one is shown to have misbehaved may therefore provide incentives to exert care, in addition to legal incentives. Compliance with a social behavioral norm seems to be relevant in litigation involving medical malpracice, professional liability or breach of contract.
We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (the fear of social disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. Speci…cally, we consider the following set-up:
1. Carelessness causing harm is not directly observable, but putative victims may …le civil actions on the basis of imperfectly informative evidence. Given such evidence, courts rule whether a defendant was careless, i.e., at fault or negligent.
2. A judgment of negligence implies the payment of damages to the plainti¤. Since such judgments are made public, they also confer additional disutility due to disapproval or stigma, given the social norms of behavior.
3. The stigma attached to rulings of fault depend on the actual incidence of misbehavior in the population and on the courts'evidentiary standard for establishing fault, i.e., on the degree of certainty they require in the presence of evidentiary uncertainty. 4 . The evidentiary standard is itself endogenous. It re ‡ects the trade-o¤ faced by courts between the risk of error in judging the case at hand and the e¤ect of court decisions on future compliance.
We show that in such a set-up there may be multiple equilibria within a given legal regime, as well as multiple socio-legal equilibria. In particular, there may be high stigma-high evidentiary standard regimes versus low stigma-low standard ones. Moreover, we show that small societal changes in the relevance of stigma may trigger important adaptative changes in the legal regime. These are shown to reinforce the exogenous change in the signi…cance of stigma, through a form of socio-legal multiplier. We argue that this may explain some of the di¤erences between common law and civil law regimes regarding the notions of fault or negligence. We also argue that our analysis may provide an explanation for trends currently observed in civil law systems, in particular the weakening of standard of proof requirements in tort cases.
If there is a stigma associated with an adverse court judgement, the extent of the stigma presumably depends on the weight of evidence required by courts. Indeed, in a system where the defendant can be found negligent on the basis of relatively weak evidence, the stigma should be smaller than if very strong evidence is needed because the risk of mistakenly condemning the innocent is greater.
For civil litigation, it is well known that common law regimes require much weaker evidence for …nding fault than civil-law countries. In England and the United States, the standard of proof is probabilistic: a plainti¤ need ordinarily prove his claim only by a preponderance of the evidence.
By contrast, as noted by Clermont and Sherwin (2002), civil-law regimes require a higher degree of proof, although "the judge may and must always content himself with a degree of certainty that is appropriate for practical life" (Kaplan and Schaefer, 1958) . The stigma associated with an adverse judgment should therefore be smaller in common law system.
As the fear of stigma generates incentives, this raises the issue whether common law regimes induce lower compliance? We show that this does not follow because evidentiary standards also have incentives e¤ects. Indeed, we show that similar compliance levels can be reached through di¤erent means, i.e. low evidentiary standard -low stigma versus high evidentiary standard -high stigma.
One may ask why evidentiary standards di¤er between legal regimes. On the one hand, it may be that di¤erent legal systems seek di¤erent objectives. For instance they trade-o¤ di¤erently considerations of deterrence and of judicial error. On the other hand, it may also be that legal systems share identical objectives but that the societies in which they operate are very different. Evidentiary standards re ‡ect the trade-o¤s faced by the legal system.
The terms of this trade-o¤ may be very di¤erent between societies, yielding di¤erent evidentiary standards.
In this paper, we explore a variant of the second explanation. We show that legal systems may in fact diverge substantially even though societies differ only slightly. The intuition is that societal di¤erences have self-reinforcing e¤ects. Small societal shocks that reduce the importance of stigmas (e.g., greater individualism or greater anonymity) tend to reduce compliance. However, lower overall compliance in ‡uences the court's priors about the defendant's behavior. Moreover, lower stigma means that the penalty erroneously imposed on the innocent defendant is smaller. The consequence is that, for a given set of evidence, courts will be less reluctant to declare a defendant negligent. In turn, this stabilizes compliance but tends to lower further the stigma associated with an adverse judgement. Altogether, adaptative changes in the legal system therefore have a stabilizing e¤ect on compliance but a destabilizing e¤ect on stigma.
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 discusses how our paper relates to the literature on stigma and social interactions. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 derives the comparative statics when the legal regime is held …xed. In section 5, the legal regime is made endogenous, leading to the concepts of socio-legal equilibria and socio-legal multipliers. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of propositions are in the appendix unless statements are obvious from the text.
Literature
The relation between legal rules and social norms has been addressed only is not "bad" in this sense, however, there are other important in ‡uences on his behavior. Whether the in ‡uence is described as morality or norms, the law does not fully determine the behavior of the remainder of society that is not bad". The economic analysis of law should therefore be interested in the power of normative incentives, whether these take the form of guilt, pride, esteem or disapproval. Cooter and Porat (2001) analyzed the interaction between social norms and legal decisions from a social cost perspective. They consider a liability case where, say, the defendant's negligence caused a loss of 10000 euros to the plainti¤ without harming anyone else. Suppose the court holds the defendant liable for 10000 euros but that, upon learning of the court's decision, citizens boycott the defendant's business and cause a loss of 2500 euros. Courts largely ignore this kind of interaction between their decisions and nonlegal sanctions. Cooter and Porat remark that "the contrast between formal state law and informal social norms could help to explain the relative advantages or disadvantages of law and morality as a means of social control". They argue that courts should take nonlegal sanctions into account because deducing nonlegal sanctions (from damages awarded to victims) would contribute to the reduction of social costs by improving the incentives of both wrongdoers and potential victims 1 .
Normative incentives through the fear of stigmas represent a special case.
Stigmas refer to the external incentives due to the reluctance of individuals to interact with persons who breach social norms (Rasmusen, 1996) . What is important for our purpose is that stigma frequently follows legal sanctions. the context of shaming penalties, may undermine its deterrent e¤ects. In their analysis, the e¤ectiveness of stigma is inversely related to the rate of crime detection. As more crimes are detected, the stigma from a conviction decreases, implying a smaller deterrent e¤ect.
The discussion about stigmas also bears a relation to the so-called expressive theory of law. According to this theory, laws have a norm-activation power in the sense that they a¤ect behavior not only by shaping the material payo¤s, but also by directly in ‡uencing people's motives (Cooter, 1998 to capture a similar phenomenon in the …eld of civil law. The intuition is that the interaction between legal regimes and stigma may yield di¤erent socio-legal equilibria.
Our paper also shares some features with Bénabou and Tirole (2006) .
In that paper, individuals are concerned with social esteem, based on how others view their true "type". Observable actions in ‡uence the beliefs of others and therefore play a social signaling role. In our set-up, social esteem depends on an individual's behavior, rather than his type, and actions are not directly observable. However, court judgments have a signaling role and therefore a¤ect social esteem.
The model
Individuals choose between two actions or types of behavior. The action n is the social norm while h is socially undesirable. In the present context, h refers to careless behavior imposing harm on others. Although carelessness is not legally a crime, it may constitute the basis for a civil suit if harm can be proved in court. In addition to the risk of legal sanction, carelessness is also met with social disapproval or stigma, which by itself is a source of disutility for the individual found to have behaved carelessly. Thus, n is both a social norm of behavior and the legal due care standard.
For simplicity, the occurrence of harm due to carelessness is non sto-
chastic. An individual's behavior j 2 fn; hg, equivalently the occurrence of harm, is not directly veri…able but it generates evidence that may be brought in court. Evidence about one's behavior is summarized by a signal x with cumulative distributions F j (x) and corresponding density functions f j (x).
strictly increasing over the support and f h (x)=f n (x) = 1.
The condition that the densities have the same support means that evidence never perfectly reveals behavior or harm. The monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), with the convention that f h (x)=f n (x) is strictly increasing, implies that large values of x represent "unfavorable" evidence as to whether behavior was appropriate. The assumption that the likelihood ratio tends to in…nity at the upper bound of the support ensures an interior solution in the optimization problem of section 5. It also means that some realizations of the evidence may be very "convincing"that the defendant was indeed negligent (e.g., he may be in…nitely more likely to have taken action h).
An individual believing he has su¤ered harm due to someone's carelessness may …le suit and submit the evidence x. Courts use a threshold b x to assess whether harm due to carelessness occurred. When presented with the evidence x > b x, they rule that the defendant was negligent and caused harm, in which case he is held liable for damages. The threshold b x is the courts'evidentiary standard, i.e., the weight of evidence needed for a judgment against the defendant. A higher b x means a more demanding standard.
Because evidence is imperfect, there is a probability F h (b x) that an individual who has actually misbehaved will escape liability. Similarly, there is a probability 1 F n (b x) that an individual who has conformed to the social norm will nevertheless be sued and found to have misbehaved. For instance, the plainti¤ may have su¤ered harm that is not due to the defendant's carelessness, but it is not always possible to identify such situations. Accordingly, an individual is sued and loses his case if the evidence satis…es x > b x, he is not sued if x b x (alternatively, he could be sued but would win anyway).
Carelessness procures a private bene…t b distributed according to the cumulative distribution G(b). Equivalently, b is the opportunity cost of conforming to the social norm. We assume that b is less than the harm imposed by h, which means that h is always socially undesirable. Indeed, some individuals may be "altruistic" in the sense that they have a negative b: they derive utility from not causing harm to others (or would su¤er guilt from harming others). An individual knows b before deciding between n and h.
The disutility from being found liable includes the damages l paid to the successful plainti¤ and the stigma s from social disapproval.
An individual with bene…t b from misbehaving conforms to the behavioral norm if
The inequality states that the bene…t from action h is less than the expected disutility due to the increase in the risk of an unfavorable court judgment.
The expression
which we refer to as detection, is the di¤erence in the probability of being declared negligent when one undertakes h rather than n. 2 Detection is positive
. However, detection is also less than unity because evidence is imperfect.
Compliance is de…ned as the fraction of the population conforming to the social norm. Combining (1) and the distribution of the private bene…t, compliance is
For our purpose, the situations considered must be such that compliance, although suboptimal (i.e. y < 1); is not too small. This makes sense in the context of a social behavioral norm which most people are expected to conform to. We make this explicit through the following assumption:
This condition is satis…ed, irrespective of stigma and of legal sanction, if intrinsic motivations induce a majority of the population to comply, i.e.,
there is a majority of individuals with a negative bene…t b.
With respect to suboptimality, observe that compliance is non decreasing in detection and in legal and normative sanctions. In the absence of stigma, undercompliance is consistent with compensatory damages because detection is imperfect. The stigma must not be large enough to compensate for imperfect detection. It may also be that legal damages are less than compensatory, as is often the case for nonpecuniary harm, thus aggravating suboptimality.
In any case, detection and legal or normative damages are assumed to be such that (3) is always less than unity. 
Judicial errors
Penalizing the "innocent"will be referred to as the type I error, not penalizing the "culpable"as the type II. The probability of a type I error is 1 F n (b x); that of a type II is F h (b x). There is obviously a trade-o¤ between the two: a higher evidentiary standard (a larger b x) increases the type II error but reduces the type I. The convex curve in …gure 1 describes this relationship.
The marginal rate of substitution between type II and type I error is
the likelihood ratio of h versus n at the threshold b x. By MLRP, The likelihood ratio increases with b x. Hence it is larger as the type II error gets larger, implying that the curve in …gure 1 is convex with respect to the origin.
Both errors are equal when the curve cuts the forty-…ve degree line. Above this line, evidentiary standards are such that the type I error is smaller than the type II. What critical likelihood ratios
do such standards require?
We assume the following:
The intuition is as follows. A defendant is found negligent only if x > b x; In …gure 1, the evidentiary standard satisfying
At this point, the slope of the trade-o¤ curve (in absolute value) equals unity.
Compliance
Before proceeding, we analyze how compliance with the social norm varies with the stigma and the evidentiary standard. Denote by y(s; b x) the compliance function de…ned in (3). Clearly, it is increasing in s. The e¤ect of a change in the evidentiary standard is given by
The sign depends on whether detection increases or decreases with a strengthening of the standard.
>From (2), it is immediate that (x) = (x) = 0, hence detection is maximized at some b x M 2 (x; x). Now, yielding our …rst result, which follows directly from MLRP.
Proposition 1:
The detection maximizing evidentiary standard is b
Assumption 2 ensures that compliance y is greater than one half. Combining this with assumption 3 yields the result. If the evidentiary standard satis…es the above condition, the "average individual"in society escapes liability. In other words, being found negligent is an unusual event.
Stigma
Society at large does not observe the behavior of any particular individual, but whether someone has been sued for faulty behavior and the outcome of the trial is public information. We assume that most people are not cognizant of the detailed evidence discussed in any particular trial. Thus, suits and trial outcomes act as signals about individual behavior. They constitute an imperfect screening device for sorting society's members between those who conform to the social norm and those who do not.
The stigma associated with an adverse judgment depends on the extent of compliance and on the evidentiary requirement for proving negligence, i.e., s = s(y; b x). Following Schelling (1978) , the social interaction literature has emphasized strategic complementarities. The greater the fraction of the population that behaves, the greater the disutility from being seen to misbehave.
Let '(y), an increasing function, be the utility or social consideration earned by someone who is known for sure to conform to the social norm. If courts never erred or if individuals were naive and disregarded the possibility of judicial error, the stigma from an adverse judgment would then simply be the loss of '(y).
However, individuals recognizing the risk of court error will factor in the information content of an adverse judgment. Using Bayes' theorem, the posterior probability that an individual conformed to the behavioral norm, conditional on not being sued (equivalently on being sued but winning the case), is
Conditional on an adverse judgment, the probability that the defendant in fact conformed to the norm is
The information content of the signals provided by the legal system can therefore be expressed as
i.e., the di¤erence across "good"and "bad"outcomes in the up-dated probability of appropriate behavior.
The stigma attached to an unfavorable trial outcome is
To see this, suppose that courts never err, i.e., F n (b x) = 1 and F h (b x) = 0; then q(y; b x) = 1 and the stigma reduces to '(y). Conversely, if trial outcomes are uninformative, i.e., F n (b x) = F h (b x), then q(y; b x) = 0 and the stigma attached to an adverse outcome is nil. Abstracting from these extreme cases, the stigma from an adverse outcome should therefore lie between zero and '(y).
According to (4), the stigma is the di¤erence in expected social esteem across good and bad outcomes. If trials were not available, an individual taken at random would be credited with the average social esteem y'(y).
When trials exist, and assuming for the sake of the argument that this does not modify y, individuals sort themselves between "winners" with social esteem p 0 (y; b x)'(y) and "losers" with social esteem p 1 (y; b x)'(y). The di¤er-ential loss of status between the two is the stigma as de…ned in (4). This is consistent with the use of s in the incentive condition (1) , where the stigma is the di¤erence between the status of an individual found negligent and one who has not been found negligent.
We now discuss how y and b x a¤ect the stigma. By assumption, '(y) is increasing, so we need only discuss q(y; b x).
Proposition 2: q(y; b x) is strictly concave in y with q(0; b
The function q(y; b x) is easily seen to be increasing in y for small values and decreasing for su¢ ciently large values. The reason is that the impact of a trial outcome on "posterior" beliefs is smallest when "priors" are more precise, which is the case when y is close to either zero or unity.
To see why q is increasing in b x; at least over a certain range, consider its value for arbitrarily high or low evidentiary standards. When the standard is very high, not being found negligent is relatively uninformative, so winners earn approximately the "prior"social esteem y'(y). By contrast, being found negligent is very informative, so losers get zero esteem. Accordingly, the stigma from an adverse judgment is then y'(y). In the next section we analyze the equilibrium values of y and s, taking the evidentiary standard as given but assuming it satis…es b x b x M .
Comparative legal regimes
One obvious reason for considering exogenously given evidentiary standards is that real legal systems di¤er. It is generally the case in a civil suit that the plainti¤ bears the burden of proof, i.e. he has to proof the merit of her claim.
As noted in the introduction, the weight of evidence required by the court varies di¤ers between legal system. In Common Law, this is captured by a standard of proof requirement. The default standard in a civil suit is the socalled preponderance of proof: the plainti¤ must demonstrate that her claim is more likely true than false, which is generally interpreted as a …fty percent threshold. By contrast, strictly speaking, the concept of standard of proof does not exist in civil-law regimes. Nevertheless, the "implicit" standard is known to require a higher degree of certainty, often captured by notions such as intime conviction. The consequence is that the claimant winning a suit under common law could well have lost it under a civil-law regime.
In the present section, we discuss the e¤ects of di¤erent evidentiary stan- is the level of compliance below which there is no stigma from an adverse court judgment. Accordingly, the s(y; b x) curve also includes the portion on the vertical axis below y b . In …gure 2 the equilibrium is at E.
Equilibria under a given evidentiary standard
In …gure 3, there are two points of intersection, E and D. However, we discard D since it corresponds to an unstable equilibrium. In a stable equilibrium, as with point E in …gure 2, the s curve cuts the y curve from where y s and s y are short-hand for the respective partial derivatives 3 . The equilibrium in …gure 3 (at point E) illustrates a situation of low compliance where the stigma from an adverse judgement is nil. Figure 4 illustrates the case of multiple equilibria, a well known possibility in social interaction models. The S-shaped curve for the stigma function may be explained by a similar form for the full information stigma '(y).
The stigma starts to build up only once a critical level of compliance has been reached, but the rate of increase levels down when su¢ ciently large compliance level is reached. This may be compounded by how q(y; b x) varies with y, as discussed in the last section. The two stable equilibria are E 1 and 
Exogenous societal shocks
In the next section, we will argue that societies may end up with apparently divergent legal regimes as a result of small exogenous shocks. As a preliminary step, we brie ‡y discuss how compliance and stigma are a¤ected by autonomous changes in the societal set-up when the legal regime is taken as given. Consider an exogenous drop in the stigma associated with misbehavior. This may re ‡ect less concern for social esteem or a more individualistic and anonymous society. We capture this by the shift factor in the stigma function, which we now write as s(y; b x; ) = q(y; b x)'(y; ) where by convention '(y; ) is increasing in .
Substituting in (5) and (6), the comparative statics with respect to the shift parameter exhibits the standard social multiplier e¤ect if the stigma
θ ′ x y s Figure 6 : Low-compliance low-stigma versus high-compliance high stigma equilibria increases with compliance:
where 1=(1 y s s y ) is the social multiplier, this being greater than unity when
If there are multiple equilibria, small societal changes may lead to a drastic change in the equilibrium. One such possibility is illustrated in …gure 6.
Assume the initial equilibrium is at E under curve s(y; b x; ). An exogenous drop in stigma shifts the curve up to s(y; b x; 0 ), with the equilibrium now at E 0 . Starting from a high-compliance high-stigma equilibrium, society now jumps to a low-compliance low-stigma one.
Both the social multiplier and multiple equilibria require the stigma function s(y; b x; ) to be increasing in y. In what follows, we show that an endogenous evidentiary standard introduces additional possibilities because of adaptative legal changes. These may attenuate changes on some dimensions and reinforce them on others, through a form of legal multiplier.
Endogenous legal systems
As already noted, standards of proof di¤er between legal systems,. However, all systems share similar concerns. First, they dislike judicial error. Secondly, they tend to particularly dislike type I errors (penalizing the innocent) when the consequences for the defendant are particularly severe. This is clearly demonstrated by numerous legal and political commentators, as well as in the works of authors as varied as Shakespeare, Voltaire, Condorcet or Tocqueville. Finally, legal systems also understand that evidentiary standards a¤ect compliance and that deterrence is one of the purposes of law.
When judging a particular case, courts must deal with the risks of error for the case at hand. How they deal with the case may set an example or even jurisprudence, with consequences for future compliance. Accordingly, we model court behavior and jurisprudence as partly adaptative and partly forward looking.
In assessing the risks of type I and II error for the case before them and the consequences for the defendant, courts are not engaged in social engineering but take society's "parameters"as given. In the present context, the relevant parameters are the extent of compliance y and the severity of the normative penalty s that would be imposed on the defendant. The normative penalty is a net social loss, by contrast with legal damages which constitute a transfer, hence the courts' reluctance in imposing such a loss. In trading o¤ these concerns, courts are adaptative in the sense that y and s are taken as given. 4 However, courts are also forward looking to the extent that they care about future compliance. We assume they can only do so in a crude way, which is captured by a concern for (b x), interpreted here as the future detection level as a function of the evidentiary standard for the case at hand. By setting b x in the case before them, courts understand that they are thereby signaling that a similar b x may hold in the future. Individuals will come to anticipate (b x) as the detection power of judicial proceedings and the b x chosen for the case at hand may in ‡uence how future courts will decide.
Evidentiary standard
The legal system re ‡ects a society's values and characteristics. We summarize the trading-o¤ of issues by assuming that the legal system, taking y and s as given, sets b x so as to maximize
All else equal, the legal system prefers more detection to less since it induces a greater compliance. The second term is the loss ascribed to judicial error in the case at hand. The parameter 0 is the weight given to this concern and the expression in brackets is the expected probability of type I and II errors, given the extent of compliance in society. The third term, with weight 0, is the loss ascribed to the imposition of the stigma s on an innocent defendant. A positive amounts to increasing the relative weight ascribed to a type I error. Courts are assumed not to care about the stigma su¤ered by a culpable defendant.
5
At an interior solution, the evidentiary standard b x = b x(y; s) satis…es the …rst-order condition
To see the implications, suppose …rst that the legal system cares only about future detection, i.e., and are zero. Then the right-hand side equals unity as in proposition 1 and therefore b x = b x M . Suppose, by contrast, that courts seek only to minimize the probability of judicial error, i.e., is arbitrarily large. Then
Since a majority of the population conforms to the social norm, the righthand side is greater than unity and therefore b x > b x M . A positive also pushes the standard above b x M . Moreover, assumption 1 ensures that a solution to (7) exists and that the second-order condition for the optimization problem is satis…ed. If is positive, b x(y; s) is also increasing in s.
The result follows directly from the above discussion. The greater the extent of compliance in society, the greater the weight of evidence required by courts to rule that the defendant was negligent. When courts dislike imposing a net social cost on innocent defendants, b x(y; s) is also increasing in s. The greater the stigma attached to a ruling of negligence, the more are courts reluctant to rule against the defendant. To capture the e¤ect of a small di¤erence between societies, we introduce as in section 4 a shift factor in the stigma function s(y; b x; ). Again, there may be multiple solutions and we discard unstable equilibria. A necessary condition for stability is
Socio-legal multipliers
The comparative statics of an exogenous increase in the stigma function
Since at least one of b x y or b x s is positive, the e¤ect of a change in the stigma function on the equilibrium s and b x has an unambiguous sign. By contrast, the e¤ect on compliance can go either way: a larger stigma increases compliance, but it also leads to a more demanding evidentiary standard, which reduces 7 We disregard the case where the legal system values only compliance, otherwise the equilibria are the same as in section 4 but with b x = b x M . 8 The so-called Routh-Hurwitz necessary and su¢ cient conditions (see, e.g., Gandolfo, 1971) are The issue we address is whether a small exogenous societal shocks may lead legal systems to diverge, although societies remain apparently similar. If this is indeed the case, that would suggest that an endogenous legal system has a stabilizing e¤ect on society, compared to the case where the legal system does not adapt to societal changes. In other words, it is the legal system that bears the e¤ect of the shock.
We say that the legal system is stabilizing if endogeneity of the system dampens the impact of shocks on societal variables. To formalize this intuition, start with an equilibrium (y 0 ; s 0 ; b x 0 ) and suppose the legal system is held …xed at b x 0 . As in section 4, the e¤ects on y and s of an exogenous increase in stigma are then
The legal system is stabilizing with respect to a societal variable if the above partial e¤ect is larger than the total e¤ect in (8) , where account is taken of the adaptative changes in the legal system.
Proposition 4:
For exogenous changes in the social stigma, the legal system is stabilizing with respect to y if y b x + y s s b x < 0, it is destabilizing with respect to
Recall from section 4 that s b x is positive (given that b x > b x M ) while the sign of s y is ambiguous. It follows that the conditions in proposition 4 are not necessarily satis…ed because the terms may be of opposite signs. However, the conditions hold if direct e¤ects dominate. The …rst condition is the e¤ect on compliance of an increase in the evidentiary standard, both the direct 9 We assume as before that 1 y s s y > 0 e¤ect and an indirect one through the impact of the standard on the stigma.
The second condition is the e¤ect of the evidentiary standard on the stigma associated with adverse judgments, again a direct e¤ect and an indirect one through the impact of the standard on compliance. 10 For instance, suppose the above conditions hold and consider a negative shock on , recalling that s(y; b x; ) = q(y; b x)'(y; ). Before the legal system adapts, the shock reduces compliance y and the stigma s. Moreover these changes may be large due to the social multiplier e¤ect. Faced with a smaller y and a smaller s, the legal system adapts through a less demanding evidentiary standard, i.e., b x is lowered towards b x M . This increases incentives to conform, therefore stabilizing compliance, but it also reinforces the decrease in stigma. The latter in turn pushes the legal system to a still lower evidentiary standard. Thus, with respect to stigma, the socio-legal multiplier is larger than the crude social multiplier computed with an exogenous legal system.
Multiple equilibria and jumps in legal systems
Normative penalties and legal incentives are complementary in inducing compliance. However, the foregoing discussion shows that adaptative changes in the legal system may substitute one set of incentives against the other. Moreover, the possibility of multiple equilibria suggests that changes in the sociolegal equilibrium can be abrupt. Section 4 discussed jumps in the social equilibrium from a high compliance-high stigma situation to a low compliance-low stigma one, taking the legal regime as given. In the same section, we also showed that similar levels of compliance could be achieved under apparently very di¤erent legal systems. We now demonstrate that when legal systems are endogenous large di¤erences between legal systems may result from small societal shocks. Figure 7 illustrates this possibility. The initial equilibrium is at E 0 under 10 Note that the conditions necessarily holds if s y is negative. legal system remained …xed, the equilibrium would jump to the low stigmalow compliance situation E 0 (this e¤ect is the same as in …gure 6). However, the legal system adapts by reducing the evidentiary standard, which shifts both the compliance and stigma curves upwards. If the evidentiary standard has a su¢ ciently strong e¤ect on stigma, the …nal equilibrium will be at E 1 characterized by the legal regime b x 1 < b x 0 . Compliance does not di¤er much from the initial equilibrium, but the small exogenous shock to the stigma function will have triggered an important change in the legal regime. At the new equilibrium, normative penalties play a much reduced role in inducing compliance, legal incentives a much larger one.
Concluding remarks
The thrust of this paper was to analyze how legal systems respond to small societal shocks concerning the relevance of stigma avoidance as a regulator of behavior. We showed that adaptative changes may lead to substantially divergent legal systems. Moreover, such changes may substitute formal legal incentives for informal normative incentives.
There is now a large literature on the crowding out of "intrinsic motivation" by extrinsic incentives (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2001 , and for a sur- In our set-up, crowding out also occurs because of a noisier signal effect. However, social esteem depends on perceived behavior rather than the perception of one's type. Furthermore, the extent of noise and the extent to which formal incentives are used are endogenous: they re ‡ect adaptative changes in the legal system. Thus, our contribution is not in providing an understanding of the intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation puzzle per se.
Rather, we provide an instance of a social process whereby one set of incentives crowds out another.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2: By de…nition, q(y; b x) = yF n (b x) yF n (b x) + (1 y)F h (b x) y(1 F n (b x)) y(1 F n (b x)) + (1 y)(1 F h (b x)) :
The claim concerning changes in y follows trivially. To show the e¤ect of changes in b x, observe that @q(y; b x)=@b x has the same sign as @q(y; b x)=@F n (b x).
Noting that @F h (b x)=@F n (b x) = f h (b x)=f n (b x), we have @q @F n = y(1 y) F h F n (f h =f n ) (yF n + (1 y)F h )
2
(1 F n )(f h =f n ) (1 F h )
(1 yF n (1 y)F h ) 
Since F n > F h , the sign of (9) is positive if the term in brackets is positive.
This requires > 1=2, but by corollary 1 the latter holds for all b x b x M .
Taking the second derivative, Expanding the determinant and simplifying, the condition reduces to Q.E.D.
